

**Research Project
Andersonville National Site POW Research Program**

**Analysis of Five Factors Impacting Confederates
In Union Prisoner of War Camps During the Civil War**

**By
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“A prisoner of war is a man who tries to kill you and fails and then asks you not to kill him.”

Winston Churchill
Observer, 1952

Background and Introduction

In 2015, History Press published David L. Keller’s book *The Story of Camp Douglas, Chicago’s Forgotten Civil War Prison*. In his research for this book, Mr. Keller found five factors that significantly affected conditions at Camp Douglas.

A 2017 Andersonville National Site POW Research Grant was awarded to Mr. Keller to investigate and determine if these five factors were present and, if so, to assess their impact in other Union prisons for Confederate prisoners during the Civil War.

The five factors considered are:

1. The lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War,
2. Inadequate plans for long-term incarceration of prisoners of war,
3. Poor selection, turnover, and lack of training of camp command,
4. Lack of training of camp guards, and
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to behave as POWs.

While these factors are sometimes discussed in the history of Civil War prisons, they often are overshadowed by more traditional causes of adverse conditions. Poor sanitation, inadequate rations, limited medical care, severe climate, overall poor health and physical condition of prisoners, and conspiracies to starve and mistreat prisoners are more typical reasons for adverse living conditions and the death rate in Union prisons. Many of these reasons are exaggerated by pronouncements in the Lost Cause doctrine; however, the five factors studied are less affected by the Lost Cause than the traditional causes.

While guards may have been blamed for mistreatment of prisoners, their lack of training and poor selection is often overlooked. The same is true of the turnover of commanders who are often blamed for lack of action to improve camp conditions without any understanding or acknowledgement of the effects of their short tenures.

The lack of any strategic plan for imprisonment as well as inadequate considerations of dealing with long-term incarceration are discussed in broad terms. The impact on prisons and prisoners

is rarely analyzed. Finally, the lack of training of soldiers to be POWs is entirely absent in the discussion of Civil War prisons.

Consideration for these factors, except for the impact of the behavior of commanders and guards, was beyond the scope of Nineteenth Century thought. A strategic plan was not viewed as necessary because of the long-standing use of parole and exchange with captured combatants.

With this practice of parole and exchange, the short-term nature of incarceration resulted in reasonable thought that plans for long-term incarceration were not needed since prisoners were rarely held for long. For the same reason, the need to train soldiers on how to act as prisoners was seen as unnecessary. Similarly, the anticipated short-term nature of the prisons justified short term assignment of commanders and guards.

When the exchange of prisoners was suspended, action was taken to improve conditions in camps in anticipation of longer terms of imprisonment. In many cases, guards and commanders from tactical units were replaced by Invalid Corps (Veteran Reserve Corps) troops improving professionalism and accountability. These steps, however were too little too late.

It is not the intent of this study to place blame on the Civil War military as it was reasonable, given their experience and expectations of parole and release, that they not consider the five factors identified in this study. The objective is to acknowledge that the factors existed and to review the significance and importance of them at Union prison camps.

The results of this study are presented in narrative as well as quantified form.

Methodology

This research consists of several phases:

- **Phase I** - Review of written material on the general subject of prisoners of war. These writings, listed in the bibliography, provide a broad background in to the subject of POWs.
- **Phase II** - Review of written material on the history and conditions in specific camps. There is less contemporary information on Confederate prisons than those in the Union. A listing of written material on specific prisons is contained in the bibliography.
- **Phase III** - Interviews and questionnaire responses from subject matter experts. The bibliography contains a listing of these individuals.
- **Phase IV** - Research visits to prison sites.
- **Phase V** - Ratings of prisons based on material obtained in Phases I through IV.
- **Phase VI** - Compilation of material obtained in Phases I through V into this report.

The conclusions in this report and the information on individual camps are based on a variety of available materials. Since many of the conclusions and comments were obtained from multiple sources, footnoting has not been used. Where specific material is quoted, it is so indicated in the narrative.

Prison Camps in this Study

Eleven camps were selected as representative of Union prisons. (See **Table 1.**) These included the largest and longest operating camps, as well as some that operated for shorter durations. The selected camps represented 73 percent of deaths attributed to Union prison camps during the Civil War.

“Most Prisoners Held at One Time” is typically used as the best measure of the size of camps. These numbers are based on periodic musters rolls taken at individual prisons. “Total Prisoners Held” is an estimate. Double counting and poor record keeping make this number difficult to obtain with accuracy. Additionally, records often do not include in the count a prisoners held for short periods of time; “Official Deaths” are taken from *Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion* and are generally considered as comparable with other prisons. However, these statistics commonly reflect only prisoners admitted to camp hospitals and do not include those who died of various causes in barracks. (See **Appendix 4** for photos of each camp.)

Table 1 Confederate prison camps Included in this study.

Prison	Type	Date First Prisoners Arrived	Date Last Prisoners Left	Total Prisoners Held (Estimated)	Most Prisoners Held one time*	Official Deaths
Andersonville, GA (Fort Sumpter)	Barren Stockade	1864	1865		32,899	12,919
Belle Isle	Barren Stockade	1862	1864		10,000	300+
Blackshear, GA	Barren Stockade	1864	1864		5,000	
Cahaba, AL	Converted Building	1863	1865		3,000	225?
Camp Ford, Texas	Barren Stockade	1863	1865		4,900	232+
Castle Thunder, VA	Converted Building	1862	1865		3,000	
Charleston 6 locations	Existing prisons & Converted Buildings, Coastal Fortification	1861	1865		1,100	
Columbia, SC, 4 locations	Existing prisons & Converted Buildings, tents, open area	1864	1865		2,000	
Danville, VA	Converted Building	1863	1865		4,000	1,297
Libby Warehouse	Converted Building	1862	1865		4,221	20+
Macon, GA, Camp Oglethorpe	Existing prisons & Converted Buildings, Fair G rounds	1861	1864		1,900	
Millen, GA	Barren Stockade	1864	1864		10,299	488+
Richmond Virginia 15 locations	Existing prisons & Converted Buildings	1861	1865		13,500	200+
Salisbury	Converted Building & Tents	1861	1865		10,321	3,700
Savannah 3 locations	Existing prisons, cluster of tents, Open area	1864	1864		6,000	2+?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As a result of transfers near the end of the war there are duplicate counts in these numbers. 					106,146	18,086 (+-)

Summary of Each Factor

(Camp ratings discussed in this section can be found in Appendix 1.)

Each factor was considered in two ways (significance and importance) and can be found in **Table 1** and **Table 2** of **Appendix 1**.

“Significance” represents the significance of each factor on the development and management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. Rankings range from 5=extremely significant to 1=nominal or no significance.

“Importance” ranks the factor’s importance in individual camps, relative to the other four factors, in the development and management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. Rankings range from 1=most important 5=least important. Rankings are based on a review of written material, personal interviews with experts on the individual camps on the general handling of prisoners of war, and on questionnaires provided by those interviewed. This rating was based on interviews and questionnaires provided by individuals indicated in the bibliography. Ultimately, the writer made the final decisions on these ratings based on all information available. **Appendix 2** contains a summary of notes on each camp. The questionnaire is in **Appendix 3**.

1. Lack of a Strategic Plan for Prison Development and Management Before and in the Early Stages of the Civil War

Robert C. Doyle in his book, *The Enemy in our Hands*, provides an outstanding summary of the historic development of prisoners of war and an explanation of this as a factor in the Civil War. The extensive use of parole and exchange prior to and during the early period of the Civil War resulted in military and civilian authorities ignoring the possibility of holding larger numbers of captured combatants for longer periods of time.

As a factor of significance to the development of camps, this factor ranked first. In nine of eleven camps, this factor ranked high or very high. Alton was ranked in the middle and Camp Randall was ranked low. Alton was an existing prison structure and Camp Randall was a prison camp for only four months.

Lack of a plan was the second most important of all five factors on individual prison operations. Nine of eleven camps were rated high or very high. Alton and Camp Butler were ranked low.

Having a plan ranked high in importance to operations in camps selected solely as prison camps, Johnson’s Island and Alton, although the lack of a strategic plan was less importance to the development of these facilities. Camp Randall, which was a camp for a short period (four months), was ill prepared to be a prison and this factor was also ranked high in importance.

The difference between significance and importance is also understandable as it was a factor that no one could affect.

- The mean for the significance of this factor in all prisons was 4.5 and the mode 5.

- The mean for the importance of this factor in all prisons was 3 and the mode 3.

2. Inadequate Plan for Long-term Incarceration of Prisoners of War

Unlike the lack of a strategic plan, this more immediate planning could be impacted by U.S. Army prison camp management of Brigadier General Montgomery Meigs, U.S. Army Quartermaster General, and Colonel William Hoffman, Commissary of Prisons along with individual camp commanders.

Based on history and the Dix-Hill Cartel, long-term incarceration was not anticipated. Although the parole of captives within 10 days of capture provisions of the Dix-Hill Cartel was impractical, two major exchanges of prisoners took place in the fall of 1862 and spring of 1863. The suspension of prison exchanges by President Lincoln in mid-1863 created an explosion of prison populations.

Until the suspension of exchanges, Meigs and Hoffman could justify deferral of camp improvements by anticipating that prisoners would only be held short-term. By mid-1863 when the U.S. Army rethought camp improvements, it was too late; playing catch-up to meet the needs of the prisons was impossible.

Planning for long-term incarceration ranked second in significance in the camps' planning and development and fourth in importance to the camps.

Six of eleven camps were rated high and three of eleven very high in significance. Two were rated average or low. Fort Delaware, rated average, was an existing facility that, uniquely, served as a clearing facility to other prisons, and Camp Randall operated for only four months as a prison.

For two of the camps, planning for long-term incarceration ranked the lowest in factor of importance in camp operations. Camp Chase and Camp Douglas were existing mustering-in camps with reasonably adequate physical facilities. Both suffered delays in approval for improvements. Johnson's Island also was ranked low due to the specific planning that was done for the prison.

Elmira and Fort Delaware ranked high in the importance on camp operations. Elmira was part of a mustering-in facility, but had water problems from Foster Pond. The camp deferred action on these problems, anticipating re-establishing exchanges. At Fort Delaware, lack of fresh water plagued the camp from the beginning. Alton was an existing prison, however, it was in poor condition, lacked adequate water, and had no hospital facilities. Alton ranked importance relatively low as a result of greater significance of other factors.

Other camps were rated in the middle; as existing facilities they could accommodate most of the prisoners' needs.

- The mean for the significance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 4.

- The mean for the importance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 2.

3. Poor Selection, Turnover, and Lack of Training of Camp Command

This factor was the lowest rated factor in significance for the development and operation of the camps. This is largely due to the low ratings of Johnson's Island, Rock Island, Camp Randall and Fort Delaware. Except for Camp Randall and Johnson's Island, each of these camps had lower turnover of command. Delaware and Rock Island were existing facilities with static garrison troops and commanders. While Johnson's Island had relatively high command turnover, Colonel Pierson commanded for nearly two years when the prison was established and developed detailed procedures that were followed after he departed.

Generally, commanders from mustering-in camps (Camp Butler, Camp Chase, Camp Douglas, Elmira, Camp Morton, and Camp Randall) were selected because they were available. Since these commanders and their units were eager to participate in the fighting, high turnover was a special problem. Camp Douglas, as an example, had twelve changes of command with nine officers, plus three junior officers in charge when exchanges limited the number of prisoners. Camp Butler, Camp Chase, Camp Morton, and Elmira had similar experience in command turnover.

In addition, none of these commanders were trained in managing a prison facility. A few had experience as a prisoner or were at other prisons. One, General William Orme, had inspected several prisons before his assignment to Camp Douglas.

In mid-1863 members of the Veteran Reserve Corps (Invalid Corps) began acting as guard units at many prisons. This assignment provided some continuity to prison command.

While low in significance, this factor rated third highest in importance in prison conditions. In five of eleven prisons, this factor was ranked high in importance. Camps with high turnover were rated high in importance.

The high turnover was a significant contributing factor to high ratings for importance on operations. Many commanders did not know what was needed in the camp. By the time they determined needs, they were shipped out and the new commander was faced with beginning again to understand needs. General Meigs and Colonel Hoffman used this lack of continuity to justify deferring repair and improvement projects in all prisons.

- The mean for the significance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 4.
- The mean for the importance of this factor in all prisons was 3 and the mode 1, 3, and 5.

4. Lack of Training of Camp Guards

Similar to prison command, guards were often selected from existing troops temporarily quartered at the prisons. These guards were frequently ill-trained and poorly equipped. This factor ranked third in significance to the development and management of the camps and first in the importance to operations. Guards were those available and little could be done to

improve their training or equipment. These soldiers were a low priority compared to the units engaged in fighting. Six camps reported this factor the most important and two as second in importance. All of these camps reported high guard turnover and little, if any training of guards. Only Elmira and Camp Randall were rated low. Camp Randall as a result of very short tenure as a camp and at Elmira other factors had greater importance.

The number of murders by guards is likely exaggerated. Lost Cause activists provided unsubstantiated anecdotal comments on this matter. The writer and George Levy, both authors writing about Camp Douglas, documented only approximately 25 deaths by guards, of which, nearly one half were deaths during escape attempts. While the number in all prisons is unknown, there is no evidence of major killing sprees by guards.

In mid-1863, Veteran Reserve Corps (Invalid Corps) guards added more professionalism to the prisons. These units, however, were frequently poorly armed with limited specific training on handling prisoners. In addition, the continuity offered an opportunity for guards who were cruel to have greater opportunities to treat prisoners poorly.

- The mean for the significance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 4.
- The mean for the importance of this factor in all prisons was 1 and the mode 1.

5. Failure to Provide Individual Soldiers Information on How to Act as a Prisoner.

With little experience with prisoners of war, the lack of training of individual soldiers on proper behavior was understandable. Not until the Code of Conduct in 1955 was issued were the expectations of U.S. soldiers' behaviors as prisoners adequately codified.

Evidence of the significance of this factor can be seen in the behavior of Morgan's Raiders at Camp Douglas, Camp Morton, and Camp Chase. These prisoners were captured in mid-863 just as the exchange of prisoners was suspended. As a result, they realized that the only way out of the camps was, escape, death, or signing the Oath of Allegiance.

Morgan's Raiders were noted for not cooperating with guards, constant escape attempts, close association and support of other "raiders," and refusal to sign the Oath of Allegiance. Each of these qualities is now addressed as desired action in the Code of Conduct.

These soldiers were likely younger and in better condition than other prisoners and arrived at the camps in the summer. They did, however, endure two difficult winters in captivity. Further, many had access to mail and packages from family members who provided food, clothing, and money.

At Camp Douglas, the death rate among this group is estimated at between 5 percent and 7 percent based on a study of death lists and an estimate of the number of Morgan's Raiders incarcerated. This death rate compares to approximately 15 percent in the total population. Based on descriptions of prison life at Camp Douglas and Camp Chase by prisoners, this group

was known for mutual support and attempting to establish a community atmosphere. This included organizing plays, bands, sharing food, and publishing newspapers.

There was a significant difference in quality of life for prisoners from prison to prison. Information from Camp Douglas, Elmira, and Fort Delaware reported groups of “Haves and Have Nots” based on prisoners’ units, prison jobs, and rank. Officers at Fort Delaware and Johnson’s Island were specifically noted as having a better life in prison. These officers tended to have a greater respect for each other and military discipline.

This factor ranked four of five in significance and last in ranking of importance in prisons. Six prisons were rated fourth in ranking and three ranked as least important.

- The mean for the significance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 4.
- The mean for the importance of this factor in all prisons was 4 and the mode 4.

Conclusion

Other factors beyond these five had an impact on prison conditions. Sanitation conditions, primitive and inadequate medical care, and the lack of basic immunity of Confederate soldiers have been well-documented. The poor condition of captives upon arrival at camps is evident by the significant number of deaths within a short period of time after arrival.

Other factors have not been adequately documented to support some conclusions reached shortly after the war. There is no evidence of large scale starvation, conspiracy to murder prisoners by guards, or freezing because of a lack of clothing.

The five factors considered in this study were significant and important in all prisons studied. The mean and mode of the significance of these factors was not less than four. In importance the mean and mode ranged from one to five with the majority in the mid-range. Two factors were outside the control of individual commanders; the lack of a strategic plan and inadequate plan for long term incarceration were shortcomings of the U.S. Government.

Based on historic precedence, these shortcomings are understandable. The Civil War marked the first time in our history a significant number of combatants were treated as prisoners of war. A total of 431,000 soldiers (211,000 Union prisoners and 220,000 Confederate) were prisoners during the Civil War. This is more than three times greater than the reported 142,227 American soldiers held as prisoners during World War I, World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam combined. The sheer magnitude of the problem offers an explanation for much of the lack of preparation for incarceration of prisoners.

Selection, training and turnover of commanders was the responsibility of Colonel William Hoffman and General Montgomery Meigs. Under the initial assumption that prisoner would be

held for a short period of time, the quality of commanders of the camps was of reduced significance.

The lack of training and equipping of guards was the responsibility of individual commanders and Colonel Hoffman. While this was an meaningful factor, ranking third in significance, it ranked first in importance compared to the other factors.

Failure to training soldiers in actions as a prisoner was beyond 19th Century military thought. In retrospect, nominal training on behavior as prisoners could have reduced the death rate in all Union prisons.

The five factors all were significant in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care in all camps. Those factors in the early planning for prisoners, lack of a strategic plan and an inadequate plan for long term incarceration were ranked highest in significance with an average over 4 in both cases. Training of guards was next highest with an average of 3.73. This factor could have been mitigated by more direct action by unit commanders. Failure of individual training averaged 3.36. Rated last was the significance of the selection, training and turnover of camp commanders with an average of 3.18. This was affected by low ratings at some camps. The mean and mode of this factor significance remained at 4. Below is a table showing the ratings of the significance of factors:

Factor	Average Rating	Mean	Mode
Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War	4.18	4.5	5
Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war	4.00	4	4
Lack of training of camp guards	3.73	4	4
Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's.	3.36	4	4
Poor selection and lack of training of camp command	3.18	4	4

Table 2: Statistical Summary of Significance of Factors
 (Note: For this factor the higher the number the more significant)

The factor importance in ranking at individual camps was subject to different conditions and duration of prisoners held at camps. While a raking of first or last is meaningful, all were considered significant to the camps. Below is Table 3 showing the ratings of the importance of this factor:

Factor	Average Rating	Mean	Mode
Lack of training of camp guards	2.09	1	1
Lack of a strategic plan for prison			

development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War	2.73	3	3
Poor selection and lack of training of camp command	2.82	3	1,3,5
Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war	3.23	4	2
Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POWs.	4.09	4	4

Table 3: Statistical Summary of Relative Importance of Factors

(Note: For this factor the lower the number the more important)

While the importance of each factor varied with individual camp characteristics, the five factors were determined to be significant in all camps studied. These five factors, which understandably were not considered in 19th Century warfare, impacted other more traditional factors discussed in the history of the Civil War.

Lack of a strategic plan resulted in the rushed use of existing facilities that were ill-prepared to accept prisoners. That lack of preparation ranged from no stockade fence at Camp Morton to the necessity to quickly develop Elmira to relieve crowded conditions in other camps. Only Johnson's Island, and to a lesser degree, Alton Prison were planned as military prisons.

The lack of a plan for long term incarceration directly contributed to poor sanitary conditions, lack of medical facilities, and inadequate water supplies.

Poor selection of commanders contributed to inadequate command attention to problems identified by these temporary commanders. The high turnover permitted U.S. prison management to defer necessary improvements. Lack of training of guards led to unnecessary wounding and killing of prisoners. This also contributed to bribery by prisoners.

There was no consideration for training individual soldiers in how to act as a prisoner. Based on the positive behavior of some soldiers (Morgan's Raiders), prison life and mortality rates could have been reduced by this type of training. It is understood that the 19th Century military mind did not consider this as a necessity.

The five factors studied:

1. The lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War,
2. Inadequate plans for long-term incarceration of prisoners of war,
3. Poor selection, turnover, and lack of training of camp command,
4. Lack of training of camp guards, and
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to behave as POWs.

These factors were significant and important in all Union prisons reviewed in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

The eleven prisons selected for the study were an adequate sample of the prisons established by the Union and represented 73 percent of prison deaths. The indication that these prisons had similar ratings on these factors supports the conclusion that most prisons in the Union were affected by these factors and contributed to the more traditionally considered causes of poor conditions in Union prison camps.

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Appendix 1

Table 1-Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

Factor	Anderson ville	Belle Isle	Blackshear	Cahaba	Camp Ford	Castle Thunder	Charleston	Columbia	Danville	Libby	Macon	Millen	Richmond	Salisbury	Savannah	Ave each factor
Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War																4.18
Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war																4.00
Poor selection and lack of training of camp command																3.18
Lack of training of camp guards																3.73
Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's.																3.36
																Total Ave.
Total	20	21	21				20	23	15	16	18	22	11	16		18.45

Table 2-Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

Factor	Anderson ville	Belle Isle	Blackshear	Cahaba	Camp Ford	Castle Thunder	Charleston	Columbia	Danville	Libby	Macon	Millen	Richmond	Salisbury	Savannah	Ave each factor
Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War	3	5	5				4	5	4	5	4	5	2	4		4.18
Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war	4	5	5				4	5	3	4	4	4	2	4		4.00
Poor selection and lack of training of camp command	5	4	4				4	5	2	1	3	4	2	1		3.18
Lack of training of camp guards	4	3	3				4	4	4	3	4	5	3	4		3.73
Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's.	4	4	4				4	4	2	3	3	4	2	3		3.36
																Total Ave.
Total	20	21	21				20	23	15	16	18	22	11	16		18.45

Appendix 2A

Alton Prison

Prisoners from February 1862 to July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted/Political/Irregular forces

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War.

Alton was a civilian prison from 1833 until 1860. It remained closed until 1862 when it was opened to relieve crowding at other prisons.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Existing prison, consisting of 3 penitentiary buildings, provided basic facilities to house prisoners in conditions similar to civilian prisoners. No water in facilities. Hospital was inadequate and built late.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. High turnover of marginal officers, two commanders were relieved for incompetence. A total of at least six officers served as commander of the camp. Col. Weer who took command in January 1864 was considered a very poor commander and totally incompetent.

Lack of training of camp guards. Guards were local and represented units of the various commanders. There was a high turnover of guard units. Little or no training.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Camp was overcrowded from its opening in February 1862 High illness and numerous escapes.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 5
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 20

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 5
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 2
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 3

Appendix 2B

Camp Butler

Prisoners from February 1862 to May 1863

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp Butler was created as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison camp in February 1862. Necessary improvements to the camp and changes to accommodate prisoners were expensive. Poor sanitation and effects of weather on the camp were known at the time of opening. Located in the state capital, it was unpopular to the population and governor. The camp was totally unprepared to receive the first prisoners from Ft. Donelson.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Frame buildings with no stockade fence until May 1862. Usually overcrowded with tents added. Sanitation and building repairs always needed. Governor warned that strong southern sympathizers would cause problems

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Initial commander, Col Morrison (2/62 -6/62) was elderly with marginal performance. He was replaced by Maj. Fonda (5/62 1/63) who improved discipline. Col Lynch 1/63-5/63 did little to improve facilities and was only concerned about keeping prisoners. There were a total of nine commanders between 1861 and 1865, two during prisoner exchange in 1862 and one when prisoners present in 1863. High turnover was a major factor in conditions at the camp

Lack of training of camp guards. Local units for short periods of time. Little training and some had no weapons. Escapes and bribery common. In 1863 the 58th Illinois, a combat experienced unit, became guards and guarding of prisoners improved

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Health generally poor with many escapes early before the fence was installed

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 5
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 4
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 3

5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 21

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 4
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 3
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 5

Appendix 2C

Camp Chase

Prisoners from April 1862 to July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted/Officers

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp Chase was originally developed as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison in April 1862. The prison, with poor drainage, was originally three camps that were consolidated in 1863.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. The camp was ill prepared for prisoners from the beginning.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Commanders were selected because they were available. Turnover was high with the longest tenure 8 months until February 1864 when the commander remained in charge until the camp closed. Ohio governor complained of poor administration.

Lack of training of camp guards. Escapes, shootings, and general poor training of the Veteran Reserve Corps were evident. Drinking and poor morale of guards was evident.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Prisoners organized selves in 1864 to support escapes. Officers, mostly from Morgan's Raiders, were better organized, including a band and other recreational activities. Some books and newspapers were available for prisoners. In 1864 a large number of prisoners took the Oath of Allegiance.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.
5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 5
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 4
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 3
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 21

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 2
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 1
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2D

Camp Douglas, Illinois

Prisoners from February 1862 to July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp Douglas was created as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison camp in February 1862. Necessary improvements to the camp and changes to accommodate prisoners were expensive. Poor sanitation and effects of weather on the camp were known at the time of opening. Had a strategic plan existed, it is likely that Camp Douglas would not have been selected as a prison. It is likely that a prison located elsewhere in the Chicago area could have been cheaper to build, offer better sanitation, more secure, and protected from inclement weather.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. The idea that prisoners would be held for a short period resulted in deferral of improvements at Camp Douglas including, build construction and maintenance, sewer construction and water distribution improvements.

When the exchange of prisoners was suspended in mid-1863 the U.S. realized that prisoners would be held for an extended period. Any attempts to improve conditions came too late, representing a failed attempt to play catch-up.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Until 1863 when the Invalid Corps (Veteran Reserve Corp) began commanding Camp Douglas, commanders were selected from units mustering in or other untrained commanders. As a result of the lack of strategic plan, officers had no training in the duties of a prison commander and there was no military specialty for managing prisons. Commanders had a difficult time managing prisoners who did not respect prison administration rank of position. Most commanders were eager to take their troops to the war failing to treat the job at hand with any sense of urgency.

Turnover of command was excessive at Camp Douglas. There were twelve changes of command with nine officers during the camp's existence. In addition there were three junior officers assigned as commanders when the camp had few, if any, prisoners. This high turnover did not allow for any continuity. In addition, new commanders were required to learn fresh the needs of the camp and the prisoners. The lack of pressure on U.S. Army leaders allowed for deferral of projects throughout the life of the camp.

Lack of training of camp guards. In the early months of the camp guards were often conscripted from mustering in units. These soldiers had little, if any military training. Later, as units were assigned to guard duty the lack of training, as guards, was evident. Weapons of guards were old and, on at least one occasion were condemned and not replaced for over six months. In mid-1863 as Invalid Corps (Veteran Reserve Corp) began guard duty guard discipline improved; however, training was not increased. Shortage of available guards resulted in assigning a 100

day unit that was totally unfit to act as guards. While the Invalid Corps (Veteran Reserve Corp) troops were a general improvement, they did provide safe-haven for brutal guards who found pleasure in mistreating prisoners.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. At no time during the Civil War were soldiers trained or indoctrinated in their role as a prisoner. The lack of respect for the chain of command, willingness to cooperate with guard authority, mistreatment of fellow prisoners, and total self-protection were typical of captured soldiers. This resulted in the creation of "have" and "have-not" prisoners. Those prisoners with contact outside the prison, jobs in the prison, or means of support were in the "have" category. Individuals without outside contact or from isolated units were "have nots." At Camp Douglas, some 2,000 Morgan's Raiders were an exception to this general grouping. These men supported each other, worked to maintain high morale, and protected members of the unit. It is estimated that the mortality of Morgan's Raiders was between 5% and 7% compared to approximately 15% for the general population.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 4
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 4
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 21

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 2
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 1
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2E

Elmira

Prisoners from July 1864-July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Elmira was created as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison camp in February 1864. The camp was developed to reduce overcrowding in other camps. A separate section of the camp was devoted to prisoners. Necessary improvements to the camp and changes to accommodate prisoners were expensive.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. In the winter of 1864 one-third of prisoners were in tents. Barracks to replace tents approved October 1864, Completed Jan 1865 when all prisoners were in barracks, although over crowded. Fosters Pond caused major problems and U.S. Army approval was delayed and correction made late. Food quality problems were a result of a complex system of acquisition. Standing water ineffective sewage removal was a constant problem. Poor medical care resulted in the highest mortality rate of all Union prisons

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Command had high turnover with no more than four months in command until the fall 1864 when Col. Benjamin Tracy remained until the end of the war. Officers of the guard were known to be cruel. Command failed to provide adequate medical treatment.

Lack of training of camp guards. 350 guards were Veteran Reserve Corps supplemented 3,000, NY troops. Problem existed with quarters for guards resulting in poor performance. Drunkenness, desertion, and cruel treatment of prisoners were noted.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Skating, dancing, and art, were common. The camp was divided into groups that lived well and those who had very difficult conditions.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 5
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 5
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4

5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 23

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 1
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 3
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 5
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2F

Fort Delaware

Prisoners from May 1862-June 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted/ Officer/Political

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War.

Fort Delaware was an existing fort that was doubled as a prison beginning in May 1862. The fort was used a staging area for prisoners with many sent to other prisons or for exchange.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. The fort was extremely wet. Barracks were constructed in 1862, but not sufficient by June 1863. Fresh water was a problem from the beginning. Rain barrels used were inadequate. The barracks were consistently overcrowded.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Until June 1863, four officers commanded prisoners. Continuity was achieved in June 1863 when BG Schoepf became commander and remained until June 1865. Schoepf considered even handed.

Lack of training of camp guards. Most guards were from batteries assigned to the fort who received no training for their duties. 100 day unit, 157th Ohio, only service was at Fort. Desertion, cruelty, and drunkenness were high. Many reports of stealing goods sent to prisoners from home.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Officers had special privileges and lived very well. Variety of work such as washers and opportunities to work outside fort were available. Some cooperation to pool money and hire cooks, etc. as well as assisting in escapes.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.
5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 4
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 3
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 2
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 2

Total Composite Rating: 15

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 5
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2G

Johnson's Island

Prisoners from April 1862 to September 1865

Prisoners: Officers

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Johnson's Island was the only prison camp designed and planned by the U.S. Army.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Well organized, books, food, church, Hoffman underestimated need for barracks. Colonel William Hoffman in 1861 developed the camp as a showplace for a new prison. Poor drainage and being subject to inclement weather were major problems with the camp.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. LTC. William Pierson commander from March 1862 to January 1864 provided detailed written regulations on the operation of the camp. Two commanders subsequent to Pierson were able to manage the camp using these regulations.

Lack of training of camp guards. Local Ohio units provided most guards through 1864 and represented general good treatment of prisoners. After 1864 there was high guard turnover with bribery common.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Officers well treated and cooperated well with each other. Low mortality due, in part, to their positive behavior. Cooperation in escape attempts.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 2
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 3
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 1
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 5

Total Composite Rating: 16

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 2
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 5
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 3
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 1

Appendix 2H

Camp Morton

Prisoners from February 1862 to May 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp Morton was created as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison camp in February 1862. Necessary improvements to the camp and changes to accommodate prisoners were expensive and slow in developing.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Conversion and renovation was not done in a timely manner. General conditions including sanitation and drainage were poor. Very poor medical care noted.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Command had high turnover. Except for Colonel David Rose, who served as commander from May 1862 until June 1863, commanders served for short periods of time. One to three months service was common with junior officers serving when prison population was low. There were reports of little attempts by commanders to improve facilities and conditions.

Lack of training of camp guards. Volunteer guards were mostly Veteran Reserve Corps and were often demoralized, In the spring 1863, guards were exchanged. Union troops without officers resulted in sadistic treatment of prisoners.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Prisoners organized a self-government which functions fairly well. Morgan's Raiders prisoners were known to cooperate with each other and during escape attempts.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 4
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 3
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 3

Total Composite Rating: 18

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 2
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 5

Appendix 2I

Point Lookout, Maryland

Prisoners from June 1863 to July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp was located on a low sandy area that held a major hospital until the prison camp was added in mid-1863. No planning for stand-alone prisons in the eastern theater. The location adjacent to a major Union hospital may have contributed to the low mortality rate

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Secretary Stanton, 1863, refused to build permanent barracks. Sibley tents used for the time the camp was open. No reason other than costs was given for the lack of barracks.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. BG. Gilman Marston opened the camp and commanded from June 1863-Dec 1863. From that point over one half dozen officers commanded the camp for no more than four months each. Since few improvements were offered to the camp, the lack of continuity was not a major fact in the conditions in the camp.

Lack of training of camp guards. Until February 1864 a variety of untrained volunteer units provided camp guards. In February 1864 until the camp closed U.S. Colored troops were the primary guards. The soldiers were untrained and created significant ill will among the prisoners. Shootings by guards and other mistreatment was common. This was a significant factor in camp conditions.

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Major Gambling. Similar to other camps, there was no significant prisoner organization and most prisoners acted as individuals not part of a military force. Poor cleanliness, depression, gambling and robbery from fellow prisoners from "tent cutting" were common. Those with special privileges such as cooks and craftsmen were singled out by other prisoners.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 5
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 4

4. Lack of training of camp guards. 5
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Total Composite Rating: 21

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 3
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 5
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 1
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2 J

Camp Randall

Prisoners from April 1862 June 1862

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. Camp Randall was created as a reception center for Union soldiers and converted to a prison camp in April 1862. Necessary improvements to the camp and changes to accommodate prisoners were not completed.

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Camp was ill equipped to handle prisoners. Commander received little notice of arrival. Development as a prison was not acceptable and it was abandoned as a prison after only three months.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Lt. Kingsbury was the single commander of prisoners

Lack of training of camp guards. All guards were untrained and poorly equipped

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Prisoners were held for a very short period of time and moved to other prison camps, principally, Camp Douglas

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 2
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 2
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 3
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 2

Total Composite Rating: 11

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 1
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 2
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 3
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 5
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 4

Appendix 2K

Rock Island

Prisoners from December 1863 to July 1865

Prisoners: Enlisted

Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. U.S. Army facility since 1804; however, it was inactive prior to the prison camp being established. Selected as a prison camp receiving first prisoners in December 1863 to relieve crowding in other camps

Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. Existence of the Dix-Hill Cartel provision to parole prisoners within ten days of capture was unreasonable when captives were transferred to prisons. This provision allowed U.S. Army leadership an excuse for making improvements as prisoners would be held for a short period of time. Original plan as a prison in July 1863. Eighty-four 22 x 10 barracks were constructed using cheap methods. Consisted of poor drainage and camp located on area of camp most subject to weather. By the end of the war the shabbily constructed barracks were in very poor condition and were immediately torn down to make way for the expansion of the arsenal.

Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. Colonel A.J. Johnson was experienced at Camp Chase was commander from January 1864 to July 1865. He represented low turnover of command. He was in conflict with the Arsenal commander, Major Charles Kingsbury much of the time and was constantly challenged by the Rock Island Argus a Democratic newspaper. Fairly low death rate.

Lack of training of camp guards. Veteran Reserve Corps, guards from November 1863 were reported not properly trained. 100 day units guarded prisoners from May 1864. Excessive drinking and shooting so prisoners were noted. Weapons firing when going off duty was common. Units guarding included US Colored Troops. The Iowa and Illinois Grey Beards who were trained to guard railways and were very ineffective

Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. Some support for escapes. 300 of 6,000 to 10,000 Confederates who joined the U.S. Navy were from Rock Island. Work details of prisoners were common.

Camp Rating:

Significance of each factor in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care.

5=extremely significant 1=Nominal or no significance

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 4
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 1
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 4

5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 3

Total Composite Rating: 16

Ranking of factor in importance, relative to other factors, in the development, management of prison camps, and impact on prisoner care. 1=most important 5=least important

1. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War. 2
2. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war. 4
3. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command. 5
4. Lack of training of camp guards. 1
5. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's. 3

Research Project

Andersonville National Site POW Research Grant Program

Analysis of Five Factors Impacting Confederates in Union Prisoner of War Camps During the Civil War

Questionnaire

While many factors contributed to conditions in Union prisons during the Civil War, this research project addresses only the following factors:

6. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War.
7. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war.
8. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command.
9. Lack of training of camp guards.
10. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's.

The following are specific questions on these factors. Please answer all questions and add any additional comments you have.

The questionnaire should require approximately 30 minutes to complete.

1. The lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War had a negative impact on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

2. Rank the lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War as a negative factor effecting camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (0=not applicable; 1 lowest to 5 highest)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>

--

3. Additional comments, including the reason the factor was present:

4. Inadequate planning for long term incarceration of POW's by the U.S. Government had a negative impact on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

5. Rank the lack of adequate planning for long term incarceration of POW's by the U.S. Government as a negative factor effecting camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (0=not applicable; 1 lowest to 5 highest)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Additional comments, including the reason the factor was present:

--

7. Poor selection of commanders assigned to Prison Camps had a negative impact on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

8. Lack of training of commanders had a negative impact on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
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9. High turnover of commanders had a negative impact on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

10. Rank selection, training and turnover of commanders as a negative factor on camp management, conditions, and prisoner welfare. (0=not applicable; 1 lowest to 5 highest)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Additional comments, including the reason the factor was present:

12. Inadequately trained camp guards had a negative impact on camp conditions, management and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

13. Rank selection, training and turnover of commanders as a negative factor in camp conditions, management and prisoner welfare. (0=not applicable; 1 lowest to 5 highest)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. Additional comments, including the reason the factor was present:

--

15. The fact that individual soldiers did not receive training on proper conduct as a POW had a negative impact on camp conditions and prisoner welfare. (Check appropriate item)

Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not Applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	----------------	--------------------------

16. Rank selection, training and turnover of commanders as a negative factor in camp conditions and prisoner welfare. (0=not applicable; 1 lowest to 5 highest)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. Additional comments, including the reason the factor was present:

--

18. List the factors from least important (1) to most important (5) as negative impact on camp conditions and prisoner welfare. (Omit any factor that you do not believe had a negative impact)

- 6. Lack of a strategic plan for prison development and management before and in the early stages of the Civil War.
- 7. Inadequate plan for long term incarceration of prisoners of war.
- 8. Poor selection and lack of training of camp command.
- 9. Lack of training of camp guards.
- 10. Failure to provide individual soldiers information on how to act as POW's.

Rank	Factor #
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

19. Any additional comments on these five factors as they effected camp conditions, management and prisoner welfare.

Name:

Telephone:

Email:

Union Prison(s) where these responses are applicable:

We are permitted to give you credit as a contributor in any material published from the project: Yes ____ No ____

Thank you for your response. Your information is essential to the investigation being conducted.

David L. Keller

Please Return Questionnaire To

David L. Keller
1368 N. Mohawk 2S
Chicago, IL 60610

or email
Attachment
to


DLKeller@comcast.net

Appendix 4


Prison Photos



Aton Prison, White building in the foreground, Source unknown



Camp Butler, Source National Archives



Camp Chase, Source National Archives



Camp Douglas, Source Chicago History Museum



Elmira, NY, Source USAMHI




Fort Delaware, Source Library of Congress




Johnson's Island, Source Sketch by Edward Gould




Camp Morton, Source Hargett Rate Biik and Manuscript Library



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Camp Randall, Source State Historical Society of Wisconsin



Rock Island, Source Rock Island Arsenal Museum

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